Gemini again. Chatting about another Russian collusion investigation. 4-year Durham crime of the century investigation already did that. So much money wasted on garbage like this. Can't we just have a better government?

7 Investigations for Hillary for Benghazi. Speaker of the House McCarthy BRAGGED on FOX they got her POLL NUMBERS DOWN

9/12/20266 min read

worm's-eye view photography of concrete building
worm's-eye view photography of concrete building

Grandpa Trump is trying to get his justice department to do another investigation into the Russian collusion crime of the century. The Durham investigation was 4 years and resulted in zero convictions. That was the same investigation that they're trying to do again. Trump seems to think he can just keep having tons of Investigations as some kind of smoke screen. What kind of money is this costing the taxpayers for all this?

Special counsel and high-profile federal investigations routinely run into the tens of millions of taxpayer dollars.

Here is how the numbers break down for the Trump-Russia inquiry, its counter-probes, and related special counsel inquiries:

| Investigation | Mandate / Scope | Duration | Direct & Component Cost | Outcome Highlights |

|---|---|---|---|---|

| Durham Inquiry (John Durham) | Origins & handling of the 2016 FBI "Crossfire Hurricane" probe | ~4 years (2019–2023) | ~$9.5 million (~$6.5M direct special counsel funds, ~$3M DOJ/FBI component support) | 1 guilty plea (FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith, probation); 2 jury trials resulting in full acquittals (Michael Sussmann, Igor Danchenko). No systemic conspiracy uncovered. |

| Mueller Investigation (Robert Mueller) | Russian interference in 2016 election & potential Trump campaign coordination | ~2 years (2017–2019) | ~$32 million (~$16M direct, ~$16M DOJ support; partially offset by ~$42M in tax/asset forfeitures from Paul Manafort) | 34 individuals and 3 entities indicted; multiple convictions/guilty pleas (Manafort, Gates, Flynn, Stone, Papadopoulos). Did not establish a criminal conspiracy between campaign and Russian government. |

| DOJ Inspector General Review (Michael Horowitz) | Procedural review of FISA warrants and FBI Trump-Russia conduct | ~1.5 years (Completed 2019) | Handled within existing DOJ IG operating budgets (estimated low millions in internal personnel hours) | Found significant procedural failures and errors in FISA applications, but no documentary evidence of political bias impacting opening the investigation. |

Where the Money Actually Goes

Special counsel budgets draw from the permanent indefinite appropriation for independent counsel operations established by federal law:

* Personnel & Benefits: Typically 50% to 60% of expenditures, paying salaries for dedicated prosecutors, detailed FBI agents, analysts, and administrative staff.

* Contracted Services & Litigation Support: Millions spent on document processing, specialized IT infrastructure, digital forensics, and e-discovery databases.

* Facilities & Travel: Office lease space in secure facilities (SCIFs), secure communications networks, and travel expenses for witness interviews across the country and abroad.

When successive or overlapping inquiries revisit identical events, the primary financial drain isn't just the special counsel's office itself—it's the hundreds of thousands of hours absorbed by internal DOJ, FBI, and intelligence agency personnel who must re-review, redact, and produce the same records repeatedly.

Do you think something different should be done with these endless nonsensical investigations. The Republicans investigated Hillary 7 times for Benghazi. Speaker of the House at the time Kevin McCarthy went on Fox news and claimed they got Hillary's POLL NUMBERS DOWN

That McCarthy interview in 2015 remains one of the clearest public admissions of how oversight tools get weaponized for electoral leverage. At the time, he was House Majority Leader campaigning to succeed John Boehner as Speaker. On Sean Hannity’s show, trying to prove to the conservative base that the House GOP had a "strategy to fight and win," he explicitly argued that creating the Benghazi Select Committee drove down Hillary Clinton's poll numbers. He later spent days trying to walk it back after widespread criticism, and the gaffe largely derailed his first bid for the speakership that year.

The fundamental problem is that the U.S. system deliberately gives Congress broad subpoena and oversight power under Article I of the Constitution to check the executive branch, while the executive branch holds broad prosecutorial discretion. When politics becomes purely transactional, those legitimate checks morph into permanent campaign apparatuses.

Legal scholars, former prosecutors, and policy reformers have floated several institutional fixes to curb these cycles:

Congressional Oversight Reforms

* Strict sunset and renewal rules: Requiring supermajority votes (e.g., 60% of the House or Senate) to extend select committees or authorize investigative subpoenas beyond an initial fixed term, preventing one-party majority inquests from dragging on across election cycles.

* Equal subpoena and deposition power: In most standing House committees, the majority party chair can issue subpoenas unilaterally. Mandating bipartisan concurrence (chair plus ranking minority member, or a full committee vote) would filter out purely narrative-driven inquiries.

* Independent bipartisan commissions: For major national security or crisis events (akin to the original 9/11 Commission model), tasking non-sitting members or split panels with equal funding and staff rather than partisan select committees.

DOJ & Special Counsel Restructuring

* Tightening the Special Counsel Regulations (28 CFR Part 600): After the post-Watergate Independent Counsel Act expired in 1999 because both parties realized it created unaccountable, open-ended inquisitions (like Ken Starr's Whitewater probe expanding into the Lewinsky scandal), the current DOJ rules were created. However, they still leave immense leeway for the Attorney General to draft mandates and indefinitely extend scopes.

* Stricter jurisdictional gatekeeping: Setting statutory bars against opening federal counter-investigations into previous investigations unless a federal judge or an independent panel certifies that specific, probable-cause evidence of criminal conduct exists—removing pure presidential directive from the equation.

* Transparent cost-benefit auditing: Requiring the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or DOJ Inspector General to provide quarterly publicly accessible cost-and-yield assessments, giving taxpayers a real-time ledger of spending versus actionable evidentiary findings.

The Structural Catch-22

The obstacle to passing any of these reforms is institutional: the party in power always wants the weapon available to wield against the opposition, and only complains about investigation fatigue when they are in the minority or in the crosshairs. Until there is enough public pressure to treat government oversight as an evidentiary process rather than political messaging, the cycle tends to repeat itself every time the gavel changes hands.

Shouldn't our government officials just want to act in a ethical way and not play political games? We're talking about our country and making it better. We cannot spend money frivolously on garbage. The rest of the world are going to stop playing our game and we have to figure out the problems in our country

The frustration you're describing hits on the core design flaw of modern politics: the gap between how a representative government should function and the incentives that actually drive it day to day.

In an ideal system, the goal of public office is stewardship—solving structural problems, managing public funds responsibly, and preserving national credibility. In practice, the mechanics of modern political survival run entirely against that ideal.

The Incentive Problem

The issue isn't usually that individuals enter public service with bad intentions; it's that the machinery surrounding them rewards conflict over governance:

* Electoral incentives: Safe, heavily gerrymandered congressional districts mean the vast majority of lawmakers only fear a challenge from their party's ideological fringe in the primary. Compromise and quiet problem-solving are seen as weakness, while public combat, hearings, and political theater guarantee airtime, donor lists, and primary survival.

* The attention economy: Bipartisan policy work rarely generates headlines, cable news hits, or viral social media clips. Conflict and high-profile inquiries drive clicks and fundraise off outrage, effectively monetizing division.

* Zero-sum party control: Because margins of control in the House and Senate are razor-thin, every issue is viewed through the lens of the next two-year election cycle. The priority becomes denying the opposing party a win or damaging their brand, rather than fixing a shared problem.

The Cost of "Political Games"

Treating governance as a permanent campaign has real, compounding consequences:

* Opportunity cost: When legislative sessions and federal resources are consumed by retaliatory investigations and symbolic fights, long-term systemic problems—infrastructure, the national debt, healthcare costs, domestic manufacturing, and energy stability—are kicked down the road.

* Erosion of trust: When legal tools and oversight bodies are used transparently for partisan warfare, citizens lose faith in the core institutions of justice. Once the public assumes every inquiry is merely political, legitimate accountability becomes impossible.

* Global standing: The U.S. dollar, our alliance networks, and American economic dominance have long rested on the world viewing the United States as predictable, stable, and governed by the rule of law. Persistent domestic paralysis, chaotic swings in policy, and erratic governance encourage other nations—allies and adversaries alike—to hedge their bets, diversify away from the dollar, and build alternatives to American leadership.

The framers of the Constitution famously assumed that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition"—meaning competing branches of government would naturally check each other's worst impulses. What they didn't anticipate was national political parties so polarized that party loyalty consistently overrides institutional responsibility.

Changing that dynamic requires altering the rules that make conflict profitable—through structural election reforms (like open primaries or ranked-choice voting), campaign finance changes, and voters penalizing political theatrics at the ballot box rather than rewarding them with attention and donations.

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